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NOTES
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal
Protection
I. THE Boraas CASE
In Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre 1 a group of unrelated college
students who rented a home in Belle Terre challenged a zoning or.
dinance that limited home occupancy to persons related by blood,
marriage, or adoption. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
finding for the students, decided the case using a novel equal protection theory, and the Supreme Court reversed. This Note deals with
the theory adopted by the Second Circuit, its sources, and its future
in light of the subsequent Supreme Court opinion in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez2 and the Supreme Court's
analysis of Boraas under a more traditional standard.
The Village of Belle Terre is zoned exclusively for one-family
dwellings. A "family" is defined as "[o]ne or more persons related by
blood, adoption or marriage, living and cooking together as a single
housekeeping unit ... [A] number of persons but not exceeding two (2)
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not
related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute
a family." 3 In January 1972, Edwin and Judith Dickman, owners of
a single-family residence in Belle Terre, rented their house to six
unrelated students attending a university located approximately
seven miles from Belle Terre. On July 31, 1972, the Dickmans were
ordered to remedy the ordinance violations.
On August 2, 1972, three of the students-Bruce Boraas, Anne
Parish, and Michael Truman-and the Dickmans, filed an action in
the district court under the Civil Rights Act of 18714 against the
mayor and trustees of Belle Terre. They sought both injunctive relief
against enforcement of the ordinance and a declaratory judgment
invalidating as unconstitutional the ordinance's prohibition against
1. 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), revd., 42 U.S.L.W. 4475 (U.S., April 1, 1974). Another
case in which a federal court adopted a new equal protection test is Aiello v. Hansen,
359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (three-judge court), prob. juris. noted sub nom.
Geduldig v. Aiello, 42 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Dec., 11, 1973) (No. 73-640).
2. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
3. Belle Terre, N.Y., Building Zone Ordinance, art. I, § D-l.35a, June 8, 1970, quoted
in 476 F.2d at 809. The enforcement provision of the ordinance provides: "Each
violation of this ordinance shall constitute disorderly conduct." Punishment for a
violation shall be by "a penalty not exceeding One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) or by
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 60 days or by both such fine and imprisonment." Belle Terre, N.Y., Building Zone Ordinance, art VIII, part 4, § M-l.4a(2), Oct.
17, 1971, quoted in 476 F.2d at 809.
4. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1970).
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residential occupancy by more than nvo unrelated persons.5 The
district court upheld the ordinance. On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed, Judge Timbers dissenting. Several weeks later a petition
for a rehearing en bane was denied by a four-four vote. 6 Probable
jurisdiction has been noted by the Supreme Court.7
Eschewing the Euclidean due process/police power analysis under
which courts customarily review zoning ordinances,8 the court of
appeals decided the case under the equal protection clause.9 Legislation undergoing equal protection review is generally analyzed under
one of two standards, termed by the Boraas court the "minimal
scrutiny test" and the "compelling state interest test."10 Under the
minimal scrutiny test, only a classification that is purely arbitrary,11
lacking any reasonable connection benveen legislative means and
ends, violates the clause.12 The inquiry made by the court can be
based on purely hypothetical justifications: "[A] statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con5. The complaint alleged that the ordinance denied the plaintiffs equal protection
of the laws, violated their right of association, intruded on their right of privacy,
impinged upon their freedom to live with whom they pleased, and contravened their
right to travel. 476 F.2d at 813.
6. 476 F.2d at 824.
7. 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S., Oct. 15, 1973). Boraas is not a typical exclusionary zoning
case. The Belle Terre ordinance excludes certain groups of people, while the usual
exclusionary zoning ordinance excludes certain types or sizes of buildings. See, e.g.,
Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371
U.S. 233 (1963) (mobile homes); Grish Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (apartments); Lionshed Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952),
appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953) (minimum dwelling size requirements). See generally
Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equat Protection, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1645 (1971); Note,
The Equal Protection Cmuse and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge,
81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971); Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896
(1970). For a complete bibliography, see 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 627 (1971).
8. The court described the traditional standard of review for zoning cases as follows:
Where such regulations represent a valid exercise of delegated state police power
and are designed to promote or protect the public health, safety or welfare, the
individual's right must give way to the particular concern of the community. • • •
• • • Ordinarily a court will intervene to declai;e a zoning ordinance to be a
denial of due process only where it cannot be supported by a substantial public
interest. Traditionally it may be justified by showing that it is related to such
matters as safety, population density, adequacy of light and air, noise and necessity
for traffic control, transportation, sewerage, school, park and other public services.
476 F.2d at 812, dting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Zahn v. Board
of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 2:17 U.S. 183 (1928).
9. "To the requirement that zoning laws must satisfy due process, as thus enunciated
by Euclid and its brethren, there must be added the important, condition that they not
discriminate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 476 F.2d at 813.
10. 476 F.2d at 814.
11. Under this standard the Court has upheld some classifications that appear
arbitrary on their face. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
·
12. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). The Supreme Court
upheld the ordinance using this test. 42 U.S.LW. at 4477.
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ceived to justify it."13 In the present case, the defendants argued that
"the ordinance might conceivably be justified as a measure designed
to curb population density and excessive rental costs, or to preserve
the traditional family character of the neighborhood."14 The compelling state interest test is of more recent vintage. If legislation
impinges on an interest that is deemed "fundamental,"16 or if the
classification involved is "suspect,"16 the challenged legislation will
be sustained only if it is precisely tailored so as to accomplish the
state's purpose,17 less onerous means are not available,18 and the state
can demonstrate that the legislation is necessary to further a "compelling governmental interest."19 The appellants claimed that the
zoning ordinance interfered with a number of fundamental rights,
including their rights of privacy, association, and travel, and stated
that no compelling interest could justify the ordinance.20 The court
noted that recent efforts to augment the number of suspect classifications and fundamental interests had been unsuccessful21 and that,
while "the rights claimed by appellants are . . . more personal and
basic in nature than those of commercial interests .•. , the present
case [does not] fit snugly into any of the other categories recognized
as requiring application of the compelling state interest test."22
13. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 349 U.S. 483 (1955). See generally Tussman &: ten Brock, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 341 {1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1065 (1969).
14. 476 F.2d at 813.
15. "Fundamental rights" include the right of personal privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); the right of interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
the right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); the right to procreate, Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); the rights guaranteed by the first
amendment, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); and, perhaps, the right to the
essential facilities for prosecution of a criminal appeal, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
16. "Suspect classifications" include classifications based on race, McLaughlin·
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971);
ancestry, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947); and, at least when there is a total
deprivation of an important entitlement, wealth, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent
School Dist., 411 U.S. I, 20 (1973).
17. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351-52, 357-58 (1972); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
18. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
19. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972), quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis original).
20. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4477. They are
expounded in Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L R.Ev. 767 (1969); Comment, All in the "Family": Legal Problems of Communes, 7 HARV. CIV. RlcHTS-Ctv. LIB, L. R.Ev. 393 (1972). Sager was of
counsel to the petitioners in Boraas.
21. 476 F.2d at 813, citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare benefits). See also United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
434 (1973) (no fundamental right to a discharge in bankruptcy).
22. 476 F.2d at 813-14.
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The court did not, however, directly reject the appellants' arguments. It professed to be relieved that it did not have to decide if
there had been an infringement of the right of privacy or travel and
proceeded to enunciate its own standard of review, a third equal
protection formula falling somewhere benv-een the two traditional
tests:
[W]e believe that we are no longer limited to the either-or choice
between the compelling state interest test and the minimal scrutiny
permitted by the Lindsley-McGowan formula. . . . [T]he Supreme
Court appears to have moved from this rigid dichotomy, sometimes
described as a "nV'o-tiered" formula, toward a more flexible and
equitable approach, which permits consideration to be given to
evidence of the nature of the unequal classification under attack,
the nature of the rights adversely affected, and the governmental interest urged in support of it. Under this approach the test for application of the Equal Protection Clau~e is whether the legislative
classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the
statute.... I£ the classification, upon review of facts bearing upon
the foregoing relevant factors, is shown to have a substantial relationship to a lawful objective and is not void for other reasons, such as
overbreadth, it will be upheld. I£ not, it denies equal protection.23

Several recent Supreme Court decisions were cited as authority for
this new standard of review.24 Also cited was a law review article by
Professor Gerald Gunther,25 which propounds a model for a new
equal protection standard that focuses on the degree to which legislative means further legislative ends.26
As described by the Boraas court, the new standard of review has
two elements. First, a court should scrutinize the legislative means to
determine if, based on the actual facts before the court, they further
the legislative ends. Judges should no longer strain to find a hypothetical set of facts that could conceivably show a rational relationship
23. 476 F.2d at 814 (emphasis original).
24. 476 F.2d at 814, citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). Judge Timbers cited
additional decisions in his dissenting opinion. 476 F.2d at 819 n.1 citing Police Dept.
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
25. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword, In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. R.Ev.
1 (1972).
26. This article appears to be the primary source of the explicit standard enunciated
in Boraas. See text accompanying notes 56-61 infra. In two earlier cases in which Second
Circuit panels discussed "new equal protection" standards, Professor Gunther's article
was the chief authority cited. See Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1109 (1973), cert.
denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S., Jan. 14, 1974); City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d
923, 931 (1973). See also Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 632 n.3, 633 n.8
(1973). None of these opinions is cited in Boraas. Judge Mansfield does refer to them,
however, in his reply to Judge Timber's dissent from the denial of a rehearing en bane.
See 476 F.2d at 828 n.3.
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between means and ends. The court described the degree to which
means must relate to ends as "substantial." It is not apparent what
degree of connection is required or whether there are any objective
criteria which a court could use to determine whether a substantial
relationship to a lawful objective exists.27
The second element is found in the court's statement that "[the
new approach] ... permits consideration to be given to evidence of
the nature of the unequal classification under attack, the nature of
the rights adversely affected, and the governmental interest urged in
support of it."28 This seems to suggest a balancing or sliding-scale
approach. The degree of scrutiny of the means chosen would depend
upon the relative significance attached by a reviewing court to the
rights allegedly affected and the governmental interest asserted. 29
When challenged by the dissenting opinion,80 however, the majority
denied that a balancing approach was intended:
We disagree ·with our Brother Timbers' interpretation of our
decision as requiring the court to apply a flexible standard based
upon balancing .... [T]he court is required to determine whether
the legislative classification in fact (rather than hypothetically) has
a substantial relationship to lawful objective. That determination of
necessity requires the court to consider evidence of the nature of the
classification under attack, the rights adversely affected and the
governmental interest in support of it.81
The presence in the case of alleged associational rights may have
influenced the high degree of scrutiny actually adopted,82 but, as the
court applied its standard, it is difficult to see exactly how evidence of
the nature of competing considerations affected the court's ruling
27. In support of its standard the court cited language from Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76 (1971): "'The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the

sex .of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship
to a state objective••• .'" 476 F.2d at 815. The Boraas court's extrapolation from "ra•
tional" to "substantial" may not be altogether unfounded. See text accompanying notes
115-16 infra.
I
28. 476 F.2d at 814.
29. There are hints of support in recent Supreme Court opinions for such a standard.
See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur, Co,, 406
U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v, Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally Comment, Fundamental Personal
Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. Cm, L. REv, 807 (1973); Note,
The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA, L.
REv. 1489 (1972). A number of opinions applying strict judicial scrutiny have adopted
this approach as an aspect of the decision-making process, E.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 30 (1968); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972).
30. 476 F.2d at 821.
31. 476 F.2d at 815 n.8 (emphasis original).
32, Certain of the cases that the Boraas rourt drew on as support for the new equal
protection test arguably applied a heightened standard of review when possible new
fundamental rights were present, rather than forthrightly recognizing the right as fundamental. See text accompanying notes 160-61 infra.
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on the substantial relation benveen legislative means and ends, since
the importance of the competing public and private interests was
never discussed.
After describing the new standard, the Boraas court considered
the merits of the case. The district court had found that the purpose
of the zoning ordinance was to preserve a legally protectable, affirmative interest of the community in the traditional marriage and in the
blood-related family unit. 83 In the opinion of the appellate court,
this goal "fail[ed] to fall within the proper exercise of state police
power"; 84 the objective was a "social preference . . . hav[ing] n~
relevance to public health, safety or welfare ... ,"85 "exclud[ing] from
the community, without any rational basis, unmarried groups seeking
to live together ...."86 The court ,then stated that, even assuming
that "a social predilection in the form of entrenched traditional
family units"87 was a valid zoning objective, there was no "shred of
rational support for the means used here to achieve that end,''88 because "[i]t is not suggested that appellants or unrelated groups functioning as a single housekeeping unit, endanger the health, safety,
morals or welfare of existing residents of the community."89
The court then turned to the village's argument that the ordinance could be sustained by looking to traditionally recognized zoning objectives, specifically control of population density, avoidance of
rent inflation, and prevention of traffic, parking, and noise problems.
The court readily admitted that these are all legitimate police power
objectives but found no rational relationship between these goals and
the ordinance:
Upon the record before us ... we fail to find a vestige of any such
support [for these hypothesized objectives]. To theorize that groups
of unrelated members would have more occupants per house than
would traditional family groups or that they would price the latter
33. 476 F.2d at 815.
34. 476 F.2d at 815. The Supreme Court found that to enhance "family values •••
and the blessings of quiet seclusion" is within the state's police power. 42 U.S.L.W.
at 4477.
35. 476 F.2d at 815.
ll6. 476 F.2d at 816. Other courts, however, have held that this is a legitimate gov•
ernmental goal. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
.
The Supreme Court has mentioned the importance of the traditional family unit
and has sanctioned classifications that affirmatively promote it. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The recent case
of In re Statham, 483 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 334 (U.S., Nov.
21, 1973), upheld federal bankruptcy exemptions granted to married but not unmarried
persons. The court assumed without discussion that protection of the family unit in this
context was a legitimate statutory objective.
37. 476 F.2d at 816.
38. 476 F.2d at 816.
39. 476 F.2d at 816.
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out of the market or produce greater parking, noise or traffic problems, would be rank speculation, unsupported either by evidence or
by facts that could be judicially noticed.40
The court did not expressly link this language to its previous
enunciation of a new standard of review, but the statement that "[t]o
theorize ... would be rank speculation, unsupported .•. by evidence"
appears to require that the legislative classification be substantially
related in fact to the statute's objective; it suggests that a court should
not hypothesize a set of facts supplying the requisite relationship, as
is commonly done under the minimal scrutiny test. The court went
on to quote language by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which, in City
of Des Plaines v. Trottner,41 considered an identical ordinance:
"Family groups are mobile today, and not all family units are internally stable and well-disciplined. Family groups with two or more
cars are not unfamiliar. And so far as intensity of use is concerned,
the definition in the present ordinance, with its reference to the
'respective spouses' of persons related by blood, marriage or adoption, can hardly be regarded as an effective control upon the size of
family units."42
This analysis could be fitted into the new standard of review, which
attempts to determine the factual connection between legislative
means and ends. It should be noted, however, that such an analysis
would also be appropriate under the minimal scrutiny test, where
it could be used to ascertain if a classification is purely arbitrary.
Up to this point, the Boraas court's analysis accords fairly well
with its announced standard (although there has been no overt comparison of competing interests). But the court apparently did not feel
that the arguments from Trottner settled the case, because it immediately plunged off in a new direction: It considered whether the ordinance was "too sweeping, excessive and over-inclusive" since the
same goals (deintensification of land use and of noise, and parking
and traffic control) could be accomplished by legislative action that
would avoid discrimination against nonconsanguineous groups. 48
The court explained itself with the following examples: 44 A simple
way of maintaining population density at the level of traditional
family units would be to regulate the number of bedrooms in a
dwelling structure. Public and private nuisance laws adequately
prevent excessive noise by occupants. Rent controls best deter rent
inflation. Traffic or parking problems can be handled most directly by
restricting the number of cars per dwelling unit.
Since the court felt compelled to suggest more efficacious legisla40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

476 F.2d, at 816. But see 42 U.S.L.W. at 4477.
34 III. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d ll6 (1966).
476 F.2d at 817, quoting 34 III. 2d at 434, 216 N.E.2d at 119.
476 F.2d at 817.
476 F.2d at 817.
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tive means to accomplish the same ends, it seems to admit that the
ordinance has at least some rational relationship to concededly valid
zoning objectives. This concession indicates that the court adopted
the less onerous means analysis as 'a ground for its decision.
There are several problems with using a less onerous means analysis. First, it goes beyond the court's avowed standard of determining
"whether the legislative classification is in fact substantially related
to the object of the statute." The court's actual reasoning can be used
to strike down any classification that has a substantial means-end relationship if another classification is in fact more substantially related
to the end. If the court is using two separate tests,45 the less onerous
means analysis may swallow the substantially related analysis.
Second, the less onerous means approach has traditionally been
reserved for cases involving impingement upon fundamental rights,
particularly first amendment freedoms. 46 The Boraas court had explicitly stated that it was not ruling on the petitioners' claim. that
their rights to privacy and association were adversely affected, but it
cited no authority for applyiIJ.g this approach where fundamental
rights were not at stake.47
The court closed its opinion with a brief se~tion stating that "the
discriminatory classification created by the Belle Terre ordinance
does not appear to be supported by any rational basis that is consistent
with permissible zoning objectives."48 This holding leaves the exact
45. The court did not explicitly state that it was applying a dual standard, although
it did say that "[i]f the classification, upon review of facts beating upon the foregoing
relevant factors, is shown to have a substantial relationship to a lawful objective and is
not void for other reasons, such as overbreadth, it will be upheld." 476 F.2d at 814. (emphasis added).
·
However, the tests were treated separately in that no attempt was made to relate the
less onerous means discussion to the stated substantial relationship test. This could have
easily been done by finding that, because certain zoning objectives could be accomplished by less discriminatory means, the relationship was not substantial. Nor did the
court attempt to relate the less onerous means discussion to traditional equal protection
standards by finding that, because certain zoning objectives could be accomplished more
directly, the classification was arbitrary. The court may have meant to do this implicitly.
See note 47 infra and text accompanying notes 237-43 infra. A general difficulty with the
opinion is that the enunciated standard of review is never explicitly linked to the discussion of the merits.
46. E.g., United States v. Robel, 289 U.S. 258 (1967); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 102 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). See generally Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970). Certain strict scrutiny
equal protection decisions have also asked whether less onerous means were available to
achieve the statutory purpose. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 635, 637 (1969);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 353 (1972).
47. The only case cited was Kirsch Holding C.o. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J.
241, A.2d 513 (1971), discussed in the text accompanying notes 237-41 infra. See 476 F.2d
at 817. That case struck down a similar zoning ordinance that "preclude[d] so many
harmless dwelling uses, ••• that [it] must be held to be sweepingly excessive [and]
legally unreasonable." 59 N.J. at 250-51, 281 A.2d at 518. The New Jersey court concluded that the zoning ordinance was outside the scope of the police power.
48. 476 F.2d at 818 (emphasis added).
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standard of review employed in considerable doubt. The language
would fit within the "traditional equal protection test, but the degree
of scrutiny employed by the court, particularly in its discussion of
less onerous means, far exceeds the intensity of review under the old
equal protection. Nor does the court explain how its bare holding of
no "rational" r~lationship differs from, is similar to, or encompasses
the no "substantial relationship" language of its test.
Judge Timbers dissented. He agreed with the majority that the
Supreme Court appeared to be moving toward a new standard of
review·but disagreed ·with some aspects of the majority's test, particularly the statement that "the nature of the rights adversely affected"
should in part determine the degree of rationality required. 49 He
stated his view of the applicable standard:
t

The recent Supreme Court decisions, in my view, require a judge
to make only the narrow value judgments needed in evaluating
means. A legislative classification must contribute substantially to
the achievement of the state's purpose.... This would indicate that
· grossly overinclusive or underinclusive classifications should not be
readily tolerated. Nor should a reviewing court defer to imaginable
facts that might justify the classification. But account should be
taken of legislative realities and the need for legislative flexibility.
In short, a legislature should be able to adopt any means that are
reasonably effective in achieving a valid legislative end or ends.Go
_Moving to the merits, Judge Timbers disagreed with the majority's position that maintenance of the one-family character of the
village was not a legitimate zoning objective and went on to find the
legislative means employed "rationally related" to this objective.Gt
He found it unnecessary, however, to decide the case on this ground
because the ordinance was rationally related to control of population
density, avoidance of rent inflation, and prevention of parking, traffic,
and noise problems, all recognized zoning objectives.112 He viewed the
majority's discussion, particularly its suggestion of less onerous means,
as "reminiscent of the 'strict scrutiny' test, which ... is inapplicable
here. " 53 He concluded, "The fact that the means selected by the
Village may not have been the most efficient or the least intrusive of
those available is legally immaterial under the means-scrutiny test.
If the means selected contributes substantially to the end, the equal
protection clause has not been violated. " 54
The most interesting feature of the Boraas opinion is its declama49.
!JO.
51.
52.
53.
54.

For the majority's response, see text accompanying note 31 supra.
4'76 F.2d at 821-22.
476 F.2d at 823.
476 F.2d at 823-24.
476 F.2d at 824.
476 F.2d at 824.
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tion of a new equal protection test. The decisions cited by the court
lend some support to t4e notion of an intermediate equal protection
standard, 'but subsequently decided cases cast doubt on the vitality
of any such test.
II.

A.

POSSIBLE .ANTECEDENTS

The Gunther Article

While the Boraas court cites seven Supreme Court cases as precedent, 55 the language of its standard was drawn from Professor
Gunther's law review article.56 He describes his new equal protection
as a
means-focused, relatively narrow, preferred groundt 571 of decision in
a broad range of cases. Stated most simply, it would have the Court
take seriously a constitutional requirement that has never been formally abandoned: that legislative means must substantially further
legislative ends. . . . [E]xtreme deference to imaginable supporting
facts and conceivable legislative purposes was characteristic of the
"hands off" attitude of the old equal protection. Putting consistent
new bite into the old equal protection would mean that the Court
would be less ·willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its
imagination. It would have the Court assess the means in terms of
legislative purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely
in conjecture.0s
So far, the model is by and large equivalent to the stated test in

Boraas, where the court required a substantial relation between the
classification and the objective. At one point in the opinion, the court
55. See note 24 supra.
56. See note 25 supra.
57. By "preferred ground" of decision, Gunther means that a court should adopt this
equal protection test instead of dealing with more difficult issues that might be posed
by an alternate standard. See Gunther, supra note 25, at 22. See also Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtue, 75 HARv. L. R.Ev. 40 (1961);
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judical Review, 64 CouJM:. L REv. 1, 20-21 (1964).
Professor Gunther finds a philosophical basis for the new test as a "preferred
ground" of decision in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-13 (1949). Justice Jackson noted that the equal protection clause was to be preferred over the due process clause when dealing with substantive legislation because invalidation under the due process clause "leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct which many people find objectionable," while "[i]n•
vocation of the equal protection clause • • • does not disable any governmental body
from dealing with the subject at hand." 336 U.S. at 112. It only asks that the legislature
redraw classifications so as to avoid a discriminatory impact.
It should be noted, however, that some authorities have questioned the aggressive
use of the equal protection clause. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND nm
IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudication, 58 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 555 (1970); Kurland, Egalitarianism· and the War-'
ren Court, 68 MICH. L R.Ev. 629 (1970).
58. Gunther, supra note 25, at 20-21.
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rejected a proposed justification for the ordinance because "[u]pon
the record before us ... we fail to find a vestige of any such support"
that would establish a substantial relationship between the proposed
objectives and the classification.59 The court was unwilling to provide
its own set of justifying facts, as it might have done under the minimal
scrutiny test. But Gunther proceeds,
[T]he strengthened "rationality" scrutiny would curtail the state's
choice of means far less severely than the [strict scrutiny] approach.
The Warren Court's strict scrutiny repeatedly asked whether the
means were "necessary" and whether "less drastic means" were
available to achieve the statutory purpose.... The more modest interventionism •.. would permit the state to select any means that
substantially furthered the legislative purpose.~ 0

The Boraas majority's approach is not consistent with this formulation, for a discussion of less onerous means occupied a major part
of that opinion. The court also did not reply to the dissent's charge,
echoing Gunther, that the less onerous means test smacked of the
very strict scrutiny approach that the majority had ostensibly rejected.61 Obviously, the majority parted company with Professor
Gunther on this point.
In general, Professor Gunther's model seems more restrained
than the review adopted in Boraas. His test differs from the minimal
scrutiny standard chiefly in rejecting an utterly deferential attitude
toward legislative classifications. Boraas, while adopting much of the
wording of Gunther's model, engaged in much broader review. Objectives, as well as means, were scrutinized, and a whole series of
alternate approaches were suggested. Nor does Gunther mention
judicial weighing of the relative importance of personal rights and
legislative interests as an aspect of decision-making under the test.
The source of the court's standard apparently lies elsewhere.
B.

The Cases Cited by the Boraas Court

The Supreme Court cases cited in Boraas were ostensibly decided
under the minimal scrutiny test, and none contains an overt formulation of a new test. While most of the cases can be read as fitting into
traditional patterns of decision, several of the cases arguably reach
results, and contain analysis, reflecting a middle-ground equal protection review.
In Jackson v. Indiana, 62 the Court unanimously ruled that the
59. 476 F.2d at 816. The court did not rest its decision on the lack of an evidentiary
foundation, for it immediately proceeded to analyze the proposed objectives, first in
terms of arbitrariness of classification, and then in regard to possible utilization of less
onerous means.
60. Gunther, supra note 25, at 21.
61. 476 F.2d at 824; Gunther, supra note 25, at 21.
62. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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Indiana pretrial commitment procedures for mentally incompetent
criminal defendants violated the equal protection clause. Jackson,
a mentally defective deaf mute with the mental level of a preschool
child, had been charged with two robberies, but before his trial the
trial court had set in motion the Indiana procedures for determining
his competence to stand trial. After a competency hearing the court
found that Jackson could not understand his defense and ordered
him committed until certified sane. Indiana's statutory commitment
procedures for noncriminals contained more stringent commitment
standards and more lenient release standards than those adopted for
incompetent criminal defendants like Jackson. The state tried to
justify the more stringent safeguards for noncriminals by arguing that
Jackson's commitment was only temporary, for he could stand tJ::ial
when sane, while commitment of noncriminal "feeble-minded" persons was for an indefinite period. The Supreme Court agreed that,
if the state's premise was correct, there might be a valid distinction,
but the Court cited medical testimony from the record63 to the effect
that it was unlikely that Jackson's condition would ever improve.
Thus, the duration of his commitment was indeterminate, exactly
like commitment for noncriminal mental incompetents.
.
Willingness to look to the record to ascertain if there is a factual
basis for differing treatment of classes is a hallmark of the equal protection test described in Boraas. Even under minimal scrutiny, however, a court will look to the record where suppositions are conclusively provable in this way, before it accepts a hypothetical argument
that may be true in some cases but is not in the case under consideration. 04
Once the Jackson Court had determined that mentally incompetent criminal defendants were subjected to different commitment
standards than noncriminal mental defectives, the case was decided
on the basis of precedent. Baxstrom v. Herold 65 had held that a state
prisoner who was civilly committed at the conclusion of his prison
term solely on the finding of a judge was denied equal protection in
that he was not allowed the jury trial provided to all others persons
civilly committed. The state was forbidden to withold from one class
the procedural protections available to all others. The Jackson Court
reasoned that "[i]f criminal conviction and imposition of sentence
are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection
against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all
others, the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice."66
63. 406 U.S. at '725-26.
64. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938): "[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, ••• unless in the
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such character as to preclude
the assumption that it rests .upon some rational basis.''
65. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
66. 406 U.S. at 724.
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Ba::strom had been a "no rational basis" decision, and the differences
in procedure in that case were termed capricious.67 Thus, although
. a tendency toward increased judicial reliance on the factual basis for
the differing treatment of similarly situated groups is illustrated by
Jackson, notably in its rejection of the argument that Jackson was
only committed "until sane," the case is merely an extension of
Baxstrom, a minimal scrutiny case that contains none of the "new
equal protection" tendencies. In itself, Jackson hardly portends a new
doctrinal trend. 68
Humphrey v. Cady 69 involved facts similar to Jackson. Humphrey
had been convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor
and, in lieu of a jail sentence, had bten committed to a "sex deviate
facility" pursuant to the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act. Although the
maximum sentence for his crime was one year, Humphrey's confinement was potentially indefinite, as the state could petition for fiveyear renewals of commitment. Under Wisconsin's mental health
statute jury determinations precede commitment; no opportunity
for a jury trial was allowed under the state's Sex Crimes Act. The
Court's finding that commitment for treatment under both statutes
involved precisely the same kind of determinations squarely posed
the question raised in Baxstrom of what justification the state could
provide for the differing treatment of seemingly identically situated
classes. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing, partly to
determine if there was any basis for the differing procedures, such as
a special characteristic of sex offenders that might render a jury determination inappropriate.70 Since the Court did not rule on the possible
grounds for justifying the disparate treatment under the two statutes,
there is no opportunity to see what degree of factual connection
would have been required to explain the divergent procedures. Thus,
the case does not directly consider whether there was a substantial
relationship in fact between legislative classification and objective.
However, the Court's refusal to hypothesize a situation where
there would be a rational distinction between sex offenders and other
offenders was striking. The minimal scrutiny standard would seem
to require such judicial hypothesizing. 11 The remand to determine if
a possible distinction exists tends to support the Boraas position that
factual grounds should support the classification and suggests that
something more than the rational basis test was applied in Humphrey.
67. 383 U.S. at 115.
68. The Court also found procedural due process violations. Professor Gunther notes
an "avoidance principle" at work in Jackson, in that basing the decision on equal pro-

tection grounds made it unnecessary for the Court to rule on petitioner's claim that
detention of a sick individual violated the eighth amendment. See Gunther, supra note
25, at 28.
69. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
70. 405 U.S. at 512.
71. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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Police Department v; Mosley72 involved a city ordinance prohibiting picketing within 150 feet of a school building. The ordinance
excepted peaceful labor picketing from the ban. The Court seized
on the distinction between labor. picketing and all other picketing
and found the ordinance unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds. The Court noted, however, that "tlre equal protection claim
in this case [was] closely intertwined with First Amendment interests,"78 and much of Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court dealt
with these interests. Agreeing that a state can regulate the time, place,
and manner of picketing, he noted that the ordinance attempted to
regulate picketing according to the content of the message since the
exception to the regulation-labor picketing-differed from other
picketing only on the basis of the subject matter of the picket signs.
This was found unconstitutional: "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its,subject matter, or its content." 74
Justice Marshall returned to equal protection analysis only after
virtually deciding the case on first amendment grounds. At the outset
of the opinion he had said, "As in all equal protection cases ... the
crucial question is whether there is- an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment," 75 but after
the first amendment discussion he modified the standard, saying that
"there may be sufficie:p.t regulatory interests justifying selective exclusions or distinctions among pickets. . . . But these justifications
for selective exclusions from a public forum must be carefully scrutinized. Because picketing plainly involves expressive conduct within
the protection of the First Amendment, . . . discriminations among
pickets must be tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest."76 This language conforms, by and large, to the rubric of the
compelling interest test, which, indeed, is appropriate in the Mosley
situation, where a fundamental right was being impinged upon by
state regulation.77
Justice Marshall dismissed the city's purported justifications rather
preemptorily. The city had argued that the purpose of the ordinance
was to prevent school disruptions, but the Court observed that peaceful labor picketing and peaceful nonlabor picketing are equally
72. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
73. 408 U.S. at 95.

74. 408 U.S. at 95, citing, inter alia, Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The case of Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972), in which the Court drew a distinction between picketing in a labor
conte.'Ct and all other picketing on private property, was not mentioned.
75. 408 U.S. at 95.
76. 408 U.S. 98-99.
77. A right is fundamental for equal protection purposes if it is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School
Dist., 411 U.S. I, 33-34 (1973).
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nondisruptive. 78 The Court disposed of the further argument that
nonlabor picketing as a class tended to be more violence-prone than
labor picketing by saying that, where freedom of expression was at
stake, such value judgments had to be made on an "individualized
basis," not in the form of broad classifications. 70
Mosley engages in extensive scrutiny; after all, allowing one type
of picketing that could conceivably be deemed peculiarly nondistracting does have some relation to the admittedly legitimate objective of preventing school disruption. However, as pointed out
above, such a degree of scrutiny is justifiable because a fundamental
interest protected by the first amendment was at stake.
While most of the bpinion dealt with the first amendment aspects
of the case, the broad statement that "[i]n all cases the crucial question
is whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably
furthered by the differential treatment"80 is noteworthy from an equal
protection standpoint, for it avoids any reference to the minimal
scrutiny/strict scrutiny dichotomy. '.J'his omission may indicate that
the opinion could be analyzed as taking a sliding-scale approach,
rather than applying strict scrutiny, as it at first appears to do. 81 Justice Marshall's language may be the source of the Boraas majority's
statement that "consideration [is] to be given to evidence of the nature
of the unequal classification under attack, the nature of the rights ad- .
versely affected, and the governmental interest urged in support of
it,"82 although the Boraas court explicitly denied adopting a slidingscale approach. However, Mosley, read either as a strict scrutiny case
or as an attempt to formulate a broad doctrine applicable in all equal
protection cases, does not adopt a third, intermediate standard of review.
In Weberv. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 83 Justice Powell, writing
for eight members of the Court, found that Louisiana's denial of
equal recovery rights under state workmen's compensation law to
unacknowledged, dependent, illegitimate children denied these children equal protection of the law. In language somewhat similar to
that in Mosley, the Court delivered a broad summation of equal
protection theory:
The tests to determine the validity of state statutes under the Equal
Protection Clause have been variously expressed, but this Court
78. 408 U.S. at 100.
79. 408 U.S. at 100-01.
80. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
81. Such an approach is advocated in a number of Justice Marshall's dissenting opinions. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973):
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970). See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 335 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); note 197 infra.
82. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
83. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.... Though the
latitude given state economic and social regulation is necessarily
broad, when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and
fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter' scrutiny.
. . . The essential inquiry in all of the foregoing cases is, however,
inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?B4
This passage can be read as an attempt to formulate an equal protection test applicable in all cases. The degree of judicial scrutiny
would be determined by balancing the importance of the "legitimate
state interest" that is allegedly promoted ·with the allegedly endangered "fundamental personal rights." The fact that the Court did
not explicitly adopt a two-tiered approach supports the notion that the
passage describes a single, over-arching test. However, an equally
possible reading is to consider the quotation to be a broad restatement of the bifurcated equal protection approach. Minimal and strict
scrutiny cases are separately demarcated, and the reference to an "inevitable inquiry" involving state interests and fundamental personal
rights can be explained in traditional terms: The nature of the personal right involved is investigated to determine the proper tier, and
the state interest is investigated in applying either test. Even assuming the first reading to be accurate, however, the balancing standard
described in Weber differs markedly from the test employed in
Boraas, for it emphasizes the scrutiny of ends rather than of means
so that the importance of the state interest is the pivotal factor in
determining the level of review.
,
The Weber Court's application of its test seemed to suggest that
minimal scrutiny was adopted. The Court recognized legitimate state
interests in "protecting legitimate family relationships"85 and in minimizing potentially difficult proof problems under Louisiana's Workmen's Compensation Act86 but stated that the discriminatory
classification did not promote either objective: "[It cannot] be
thought here that persons will shun illicit relations because the offspring may not one day reap the benefits of workmen's compensation.
. . . Our decision ... will not expand claimants for workmen's compensation beyond tliose in a direct blood and dependency relationship
·with the deceased ...." 87 But the Coui:t's analysis concludes, "The
inferior classification of dependent unacknowledged illegitimates
bears, in this instance, no significant relationship to. those recognized
84.
85.
86.
87.

406
406
406
406

U.S. at 172-73.
U.S. at 173.
U.S. at 174.
U.S. at 173-75.
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purposes of recovery which workmen's compensation statutes commendably serve."88
The Court's reference to a significant, rather than a rational, relationship indicates that it was applying some form of heightened review89 and seems to s.uggest a particular sensitivity to illegitimacy as a
classification. This is not surprising, since illegitimacy bears many of
the hallmarks-including group stigmatization, a history of discrimination, and ready identifiability-of recognized suspect classifica•
tions. 90 The Weber Court seemed to recognize the suspect nature of
the class when it noted that "imposing disabilities on the illegitimate
child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility .... " 01 The
Court, in a later case,92 appeared to reaffirm the view that illegitimacy
is a 'suspect classification when it stated with regard to paternal sup•
port that "[w]e therefore hold that once a State posits a judicially
enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their
natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for
denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural
father has not married its mother." 03 Thus, Weber can best be explained as the judicial recognition of illegitimacy as a suspect classification and, therefore, may not offer much support for the Boraas test.
Both Judge Timbers, in his dissent in Boraas, and Professor
Gunther consider James v. Strange 94 to be the best example of the
new equal protection.05 James found Kansas' method of recouping
legal defense fees expended for indigent defendants to be unconsti•
tutional. Under the recoupment procedure, the former defendant was
denied certain exemptions, including protection from wage garnishments, available to all other civil debtors. 00 The Court, quoting from
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 97 stated that
the Equal Protection Clause "imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out." ... This requirement
88. 406 U.S. at 175 (emphasis added).
89. The Court also rejected one state justification because "it is not compelling in a

statutory compensation scheme where dependency on the deceased is a prerequisite to
anyone's-recovery ••.•" 406 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added).
90. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage as a suspect class);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race as a suspect class); Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633 (1948) (ancestry as a suspect class).
91. 406 U.S. at 175.
92. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam).
93. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam).
94. 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
95. See 476 F.2d at 820; Gunther, supra note 25, at 33.
96. The Court has recently shown a notable solicitude in regard to limiting the
more draconian effects of creditor remedies. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
97. 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
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is lacking where, as in the instant case, the State has subjected indigent defendants to such discriminatory conditions of repayments .
• . . [T]o impose these harsh conditions on a class of debtors who were
provided counsel as required by the Constitution is to practice . . .
a discrimination which the Equal Protection Clause proscribes.98
'

The Court agreed that the state had a legitimate interest in regaining
the expended funds 99 but cited no state argument in support of the
distinction between the two classes of debtors.
It is important to note that the Court departed from traditional
minimal scrutiny review in that it did not feel C(?mpelled to supply a
justification.100 The Court might have, for instance, suggested that
indigent criminal defendants , are arguably more prone to, conceal
assets than are civil debtors and, hence, should not receive the benefits
of the exemption statutes. While James drew on Rinaldi v. Yeager,
a minimal scrutiny decision that held that a New Jersey statute
requiring only those indigent defendants who were sentenced, to
prison terms to reimburse the state for the cost of transcripts on appeal, in Rinaldi, unlike James, the Court considered a series of hypothetical legislative purposes before striking down the classification, as
having no rational relationship to any proposed objective.101 The
level of review in James is thus more stp.ngent than conventio,nal
minimal scrutiny.
James also illustrates Gunther's "preferred ground" ~pproach.102
The district court had held the Kansas statute invalid as placing an
impermissible burden on the constitutionally guaranteed right to
counseI.103 By deciding the case on equal protection grounds, the
Court avoided the difficult question of the constitutional valiility of
any state recoupment procedure.104
·
Professor Gunther comments on the case:
Justice Powell perceived the readily apparent dissimilarity between
indigent defendants and other judgment debtors ·with respect to
exemptions; encountered no articulated state ground for the difference; refused to strain his imagination to supply that missing
explanation; and accordingly found that the "some rationality" requirement had not been met. Justice Powell was plainly unwilling
98. 407 U.S. at 140-41, quoting 384 U.S. at 308-09.
99. 407 U.S. at 141.
100. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
101. 384 U.S. at 309-10.
102. See note 57 supra.
103. Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Kan. 1971) (three-judge court).
104. The right to counsel in criminal cases is guaranteed by Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Several other decisions
have removed financial barriers that faced indigents involved in the criminal process.
See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to state-supplied transcript on criminal appeal).
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to consider all the conceivable state justifications .... His invalidation for lack of an offered explanation conformed to the less
deferential stance suggested by the model.10u
This seems to indicate that the critical difference between James, or
Gunther's view of James, and the old equal protection is the lack of
inclination to supply a judicially hypothesized rationale, really a
"less deferential stance." Since the Boraas majority went far beyond
this standard in their questioning of the degree of means-end connection and their discussion of less onerous means, James does not settle
the question of the authority for Boraas.106
The two cases principally relied upon by the Boraas majority were
Reed v. Reed1°7 and Eisenstadt v. Baird.108 Reed held unconstitutional an Idaho probate provision that gave men a mandatory preference over women when persons of the same priority class applied for
appointment to administer a decedent's estate. The statutory objective
was probate simplification, an admittedly legitimate objective.100
Using language quoted in both Boraas and Baird,110 the Court stated:
A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly cir'cumstanced shall be treated alike." •.. The question presented by
this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of competing ap•
plicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship
to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by [the statute].111
Eliminating a class of applicants for letters of adminstration would
seem to simplify probate procedure, but the Court decided that "[t]o
give a mandatory preference to members of either sex ... is to make
the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause ... :•112
· The Boraas court read this language as requiring something more
105. Gunther, supra note 25, at 33.
106. The Boraas court did comment that "[i]f some or all of these hypothesized ob•
jectives [such as rent control, use intensity, and traffic control] were supportable, some
form of such ordinance might conceivably be upheld as a valid exercise of state police
power. Upon the record before us, however, we fail to find a vestige of any such sup•
port." 476 F.2d at 816. Taken alone, this appears to be an example of the Gunther
standard, under which a court will not be bound to theorize a permissible objective,
But the Boraas court immediately began to discuss inadequate links between means and
ends, thus making it quite unclear whether the element unsupported by the record was
the hypothesized objective or the means-end link.
107. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
108. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
109. 404 U.S. at 76. .
HO. 405 U.S. at 447; 476 F.2d at 814·15.
lll. 404 U.S. at 76, quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920),
112. 404 U.S. at 76.
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stringent than a mere rational relationship between means and ends,
in spite of Reed's announced rational relationship requirement. Both
the Boraas dissent and Professor Gunther thought that Reed reflected
a special suspicion of sex classifications.118 Rather than considering the
Reed result as a manifestation of increased judicial scrutiny, however,
it might be fruitful to focus on the Court's statement that the classification was "arbitrary." If the Idaho statute had given a mandatory
preference to all persons under five feet, seven inches tall, the statutory objective of simplifying probate procedures would be advanced
in the same way as by giving preferred status to men, for in either case
a class of applicants would be eliminated. Yet a classification based on
height would certainly be struck down as arbitrary. The key is that,
not only must there be a rational means-end relationship, but also the
intrinsic characteristic of the class must bear some relationship to the
proposed statutory objective.114 Thus, Reed can be read as focusing,
in traditional equal protection fashion, on the second step of this
two-step inquiry, the rational basis for the differing treatment of
similarly situated groups.
However, the case can be read to support the heightened review
found in Boraas. The Court in Reed took no notice of the argument,
put fonvard in respondent's brief,115 that men are likely to have more
business experience than women and thus would make more suitable
executors. The Court's failure to accept this argument might indicate
that it still found no rational basis for the classification. But it is also
possible that, since not every woman would have less business experience than every man, the relationship between the classification
and the objective was not considered rational enough or, as worded in
Boraas, substantial enough to pass constit~tional muster. This ap113. 476 F.2d at 820 (Timbers, J.); Gunther, supra note 25, at 34. Justice Marshall,
dissenting in Rodrigue:, suggested that classifications based on factors, such as race or
illegitimacy, that are totally beyond an individual's control should be considered inherently suspect. 411 U.S. at 108-09. See the discussion at text accompanying notes 11922 infra.
114. See De:velopments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 13, at 1082-83. See
also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) ("The inferior classification
of illegitimates bears ••• no significant relationship to those recognized purposes of recovery (served by workmen's compensation statutes]."); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897),
This approach also comports with the analysis of Professors Tussman and ten Broek,
supra note 13, at 343-53. Their explication began with the proposition that "[a] reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law" and excludes all others. Id. at 346. The. analysis of a
legislative classification would thus involve the following steps: (1) identification of the
purpose of the law; (2) determination of the ideal disadvantaged class-ideal in the
sense that it contains all those similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law,
and no others; (3) comparison of the legislative classification with the ideal class; and
(4) determination of the permissible degree of deviation from the ideal.
115. See Brief for Appellee at 12.
116. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
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proach would be quite similar to that taken in Boraas, where the
court noted that not every nonrelated group caused additional traffic,
noise, or rent-inflatipn.116 This mode of reasoning, however, is not
explicit in Reed,117 and later cases indicate the Court might not be
disposed to read Reed in this way.118
Four justices, in a subsequent case, read Reed as applying the
strict scrutiny test. In Frontiero v. Richardson119 the Court ruled on
• differing statutory treatment of men and women in the armed services
who attempted to obtain increased quarters allowances and medical
and dental benefits for themselves and their dependent spouses. Wives
of uniformed men were presumed dependent, while husbands of
unifon;ned women were not. The differing treatment was found
unconstitutional, and four members of the Court, viewing Reed as a
• strict scrutiny opinion, held that classifications based on sex were
inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny.120 The
plurality felt that the respondent's argument in Reed-that men could
legitimately be presumed to be better administrators than women
because they had more business experience-was enough to satisfy the
rational basis test. Since the Court had found a violation of the equal
protection clause, the argument went, strict judicial scrutiny must
have been tacitly applied.121
This assumption that an equal protection case must be decided
under either the rational basis test or the strict scrutiny test involves
a certain amount of judicial pushing-under-the-rug of awkward
elements that do not easily fit into either tier. For instance, the
Frontiero plurality did not mention the Reed Court's failure to address the inherent suspectness of sex classifications. If the case is not
117. Noteworthy in Reed is the Court's assumption of arbitrariness in the face of the
ignored rational distinction between men and women-specifically, the greater business
experience of men. A like assumption of similarity of situation occurred in James, where
the Court assumed without discussion that indigent criminal defendants are not more
prone to conceal assets than are civil debtors. See text following note 100 supra, Profes•
sor Gunther's, and Boraas's, requirement that some factual demonstration be made
might be lurking here, for the failure of the government to show grounds of distinction
could explain the brusque assumption by each Court that the classifications were arbitrary.
118. A number of recent cases have also questioned whether the goal of administra•
tive convenience should be afforded legitimate status in every case. These cases found
constitutional violations even though the state could show some rational basis between
the classification and the objective of administrative convenience. See Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972).
The lack of deference shown in Reed to the state's objective of facilitating probate
administration could be explained by the Court's downgrading of this one particular
objective. This approach would not be available in Boraas, where traditional zoning ob•
jectives were propounded.
119. 4ll U.S. 677 (1973).
120. 411 U.S. at 688.
121. 411 U.S. at 682-84.
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to be forced into a mold, it is at least arguable that Reed applied some
sort of intermediate standard of review. The recognition of an emerging invidious classification could justify the heightened scrutiny.122
Although the Frontiero plurality interpreted Reed as a compelling interest case, this does not alter the fact that the Court in ~eed
was willing to employ a review stronger than the ration:µ relationship
standard, yet was not ·willing to employ strict judicial scrutiny. Therefore, Reed arguably applies a form of intermediate review and lendsv
support to Boraas.
At issue in Eisenstadt v. Baird123 was a Massachusetts statute that
made it a crime for anyone to dispense contraceptives to unmarried
persons. Physicians and pharmacists were permitted to dispense contraceptives to married persons, and the statute had been construed to
permit anyone to dispense contraceptives to married or unmarried
persons for the purpose of preventing disease. The Court found the
statute unconstitutional.124 The majority opinion allegedly used
minimal scrutiny and posited the test in these terms: " 'The Equal
Protection Clause . . . den[ies] to States the power to legislate that
different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.' "125 The Court then described the issue as
"whether there is some ground of difference that rationally explains
the different treatment accorded married and unmarried persons
under [the statute]."126
The first goal considered by the Court was the discouragement of
premarital sexual activity. The majority found that the statute had
"at best a marginal relation" to this objective because it allowed
unmarried people to obtain contraceptives if they were used to prevent disease. Also, married persons could obtain contraceptives to
engage in sexual activity with unmarried persons. The slight effect
on premarital sexual activity plus the fact that fornication was already
a misdemeanor led the Court to conclude that deterrence of premarital sex was not the statutory objective.127
122, Weber also arguably fits this pattern, for illegitimacy appears to have been
held to be a suspect classification in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam),
123, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), The case is discussed in Note, Legislative Purpose, Rational•
ity, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 124-28 (1972),
124. There were a variety of opinions explaining the result. Justice Brennan's majority opinion, which voided the statute on equal protection grounds, drew the support
of Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart. Justice Douglas also wrote a concurring
opinion based on the first amendment, and Justices White and Blackmun concurred on
the ground that the statute impinged on the fundamental right of marital privacy without an adequate state interest being shown. Chief Justice Burger dissented, and Justices
Powell and Rehnquist did not participate.
125. 405 U.S. at 447, quoting Reed, 404 U.S. at 75-76,
126. 405 U.S. at 447.
127, 405 U.S. at 450,
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The majority opinion then rejected a second possible purpose,
the state's desire to regulate the distribution of potentially dangerous
drugs and devices. The opinion questioned the danger presented by
the use of certain contraceptives128 but found that, even assuming
that contraceptives were dangerous enough to require a physician's
prescription, the need for such a requirement was equally great for
married and unmarried persons.129 The exclusion of unmarried
persons from the benefits of a physician's help in obtaining contraceptives, the majority's lack of belief that the "legislature suddenly
reversed its field and developed an interest in health" after having a
different purpose for similar prior legislation,130 and the fact that
existing federal and state legislation regulated the distribution of
harmful drugs131 led the Court to the conclusion that the regulation
of potentially harmful drugs was not the object of the statute.182
The Court then considered its own theory as to the purpose of the
Iegislation: 133 an outright ban on the use of contraceptives to the
extent permitted by Griswold v. Connecticut. 134 Under Griswold a
ban on giving contraceptives to married persons is impermissible.
Baird stated that if the state attempted to provide that married persons
could receive contraceptives and unmarried persons could not, "[i]n
each case the evil, as perceived by the State, would be identical, and
the underinclusion would be invidious." 130 Thus, the Court found
that the legislation could have been passed to further this impermis128. 405 U.S. at 451 n.9. In his concurring opinion, Justice White, while finding that
the state's purported objective of limiting the channels of distribution of potentially
dangerous commodities was entirely legitimate, voted to reverse the conviction because
there was no evidence in the record that the particular contraceptive in question, a
packet of vaginal foam, was dangerous, 405 U.S. at 464.
Justice White admitted a "general reluctance to question a State's judgment on matters of public health," 405 U.S. 'at 463, but went on: "Due regard for protecting con•
stitutional rights requires that the record contain evidence that a restriction on distribution of vaginal foam is essential to achieve the statutory purpose ••••" 405 U.S. at 464.
The constitutional right involved was the right of marital privacy found in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice White believed that the Griswold right was relevant to the present case because the offense prohibited by the statute was distribution
of contraceptives by an unlicensed person to either married or unmarried persons. 405
U.S. at 462. Since the prohibition on the distribution of harmless contraceptives to
married persons violated Griswold, and the record contained no evidence to show
whether the recipient in Baird was married or unmarried, the factual inquiry into the
potential harmfulness of the distributed contraceptive was warranted so that a constitutional right would not be unduly burdened. Thus, Justice White applied the strict scrutiny test to reach the same result as the majority.
129. 405 U.S. at 450.
130. 405 U.S. at 450, citing Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1401 (1st Cir. 1970).
131. 405 U.S. at 452.
132. 405 U.S. at 452.
133. 405 U.S. at 452-54.
134. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
135. 405 U.S. at 454.
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sible objective, but that if this were the objective the law would violate the equal protection clause.
The opinion contains some elements of the Boraas version of the
new equal protection test; 136 little, if any, deference is paid to the
avowed legislative .objective, and the level of review is certainly
greater than under the minimal scrutiny standard. But the scrutiny
in Baird is largely directed at the legislative objective, not at the
means of achieving it. Two explicit objectives are rejected, and the
Court found an imputed objective impermissible, an approach at variance with the Gunther equal protection, which theoretically considers only those objectives on the record before the court. This intense examination of legislative objectives and searching for unstated
legislative purposes is a salient characteristic of the strict scrutiny approach.187 It is true that no fundamental interest was said to be at
stake in Baird, but much of the tortuous analysis in the majority
opinion seems to be an attempt to avoid deciding the case on Griswold
grounds.188 Moreover, the Court's finding of no rational relationship139 is also open to criticism, since parts of the statute were arguably related (the Court agreed that at least a "marginal relation"
existed140) to the two objectives suggested by the state.141 Thus, while
the degree of review in Baird is, quite intense, the review conforms
inexactly ·with both Boraas and Gunther in that the main thrust of
the opinion is directed toward uncovering the actual pun,ose of the
Massachusetts legislature, rather than toward determinin'g if the different treatment of married and unmarried persons is in fact related
to a valid public purpose.142
136. The unwillingness to allow a permissible distinction between married and unmarried people may bear tangentially on whether a municipality can affirmatively favor
a family group in its zoning legislation. But see note 36 supra.
,
137. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972); Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964).
138. In dicta the majority pointed the way to an extension of Griswold:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind
and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.
405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis original). See 405· U.S. at 447 n.7.
139. 405 U.S. at 454-55.
140. 405 U.S. at 448.
141. The Court's procedure has been characterized as a "divide and conquer" analytic technique. If the Court had not separated legislative goals, but had considered an
over-all legislative goal encompassing both of the objectives considered by the Court,
the finding that there was no rational relationship bet:111een the goals and and the statute
would have been much more difficult to make. Note, supra note 123, at 124-28.
142. If the Baird technique had been applied in Boraas, the court would have rejected various statutory objectives as not credible because the blood-related classifica•
tion was not closely enough related to the suggested objective or because laws already

532

Michigan Law Review ·

[Vol, 72:508

It is also possible to view Baird as supporting some type of middleground equal protection review. It could be argued that when there
is an emerging fundamental right under adjudication-a right that
the Court is unwilling at this point to designate as fundamental but
that has the characteristics of previously recognized fundamental
rights-the Court will begin stretching the rational basis test, In
Baird, this right would be the possible extension of the Griswold
rights of marital privacy and association to protect unmarried indi,viduals. Following this idea, it could be argued that the Baird Court,
faced with a right of possible constitutional proportions but unwilling to recognize it as such by overtly applying the compelling interest
test, paid less heed to conceivable rational relationships than is customary under the minimal scrutiny standard. The Court's examina•
tion of legislative objectives, at least to the extent of trying to determine the actual objective of the legislation, and its refusal to defer to
the normally sacrosanct legislative goal of public health148 are both
techniques foreign to minimal scrutiny.
The opinion also mirrored Reed and James in ignoring conceivable grounds for distinguishing between seemingly similarly situated
groups. The Court stated that denial of contraceptive distribution to
unmarried persons in order to salvage so much of the state's morality
code as Griswold would allow would violate the equal protection
clause because "[i]n each case the evil, as perceived by the State, would
be identical, and the underinclusion would be invidious."144 In other
words, the Court assumed that no fair ground of distinction between
married and unmarried persons was possible here. As will be discussed,145 this failure to discuss possible justifications runs through
existed to accomplish the same purposes. Then it would have formulated its own notion
as to the village's objective-for instance, a desire to keep college students out of the

·community. Such an objective would not advance any legitimate police power purpose
and so would violate the equal protection clause. Of course, this analysis was not
adopted in Boraas. Indeed, the court suggested legislation that could be passed to accomplish the same zoning objectives, a reverse of the Baird approach.
The Baird approach does not take into account a line of cases dating back to Fletcher
v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 129, 131 (1810), in which the Supreme Court has maintained that a statute cannot be invalidated merely because the legislature's action was
motivated by impermissible considerations. An exception has been found in cases involving unstated racially discriminatory objectives. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd,,
377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1960). But see
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971).
Some very able commentators have suggested, however, that courts have carried their
refusal to examine official purposes to an undesirable extreme. See Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971
SUP. CT. REv. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
143. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
144. 405 U.S. at 454.
145. See text accompanying notes 157-61 infra.
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the precedents cited by the Boraas court, and may well form the basis
for an intermediate standard of equal protection review.
C.

Observations on the Cases Cited in Boraas

It is difficult to generalize about the group of cases cited as precedent in Boraas. The cases do not forthrightly enunciate any doctrinal
shift. Even assuming some emerging new standard, the most obvious
feature shared by the cases is the Court's willingness to use the equal
protection clause as a vehicle for avoiding more controversial rationales.146 As a result, the minimal scrutiny test has been applied
with a bit more bite and with a less quiescent attitude toward legislative goals. It should be noted, ho1vever, that the Court gave no indication of when it would employ this heightened scrutiny,147 and in
other cases from the same term it retained the traditional two-tier approach.148
Viewed less charitably, the cases can be taken to show that no
new test exists at all. Jackson,1 49 Humphrey, 150 and ]ames151 only extended past rational-basis precedents. Mosley 152 and Baird153 can be
read as involving fundamental interests, which justify strict judicial
146. See note 57 supra.
147. Neither the Boraas court nor Professor Gunther really come to grips with this
problem. The Boraas majority briefly suggests, "This approach is particularly appropriate in cases of the present type, where individual human rights of groups as opposed
to business regulations are involved," 476 F.2d at 815, but neglects to say why the standard was not employed in cases such as Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare), or Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing), where individual rights to welfare and housing benefits were at stake.
Professor Gunther suggests that the use of his model would be limited only by considerations of "judicial competence," rather than on the basis of "a priori categorizations of the 'social :i,nd economic' variety." Gunther, supra note 25, at 23. He assumes
that there is judicial competence to determine "the rationality of means used in solving
many 'economic and social' problems," id. at 24 (emphasis added), but not to solve problems that are "exceedingly technical and complex" or problems in response to which the
legislature can legitimately adopt several approaches. Id. Gunther, however, does not
consider the difficulty of dealing with an ad hoc standard, the application of ·which
would be rendered even more uncertain by the level of "competence" of whoever happened to be on the court at the time. In addition it does not appear that the courts are
limiting the new standard in such a way. The Second Circuit, in Aguayo v. Richardson,
473 F.2d 1090, 1109 (1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S., Jan. 14, 1974), cited the
new approach in an opinion remanding a particularly complex case.
148. Minimal scrutiny was employed in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Schill v. Knebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971); and Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U.S. 356 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); and United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973).
149. See text accompanying notes 62-68 supra.
150. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
151. See text accompanying notes 94-106 supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 72-82 supra,
153. See text accompanying notes 123-44 supra.
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review. Reed154 and Weber155 can be interpreted as involving suspect
classifications, and Reed can also be read as an orthodox strikingdown of an arbitrary classification.
This group of Supreme Court cases, however, can also be seen as
pointing toward a middle-ground test of equal protection, a test requiring more than a conceivable rational relationship. As noted previously,156 equal protection analysis always involves a dual inquiry:
Not only must the means be rationally related to the ends, but the
intrinsic nature of the class must bear some relationship to the statutory objective, so that similarly situated groups are not treated differently. It is suggested that it is in this second area that the Court is applying heightened judicial scrutiny.
In Jackson the Court's inquiry centered on whether the especially
severe commitment procedures for mentally defective criminal defendants could be distinguished from commitment procedures for all
other individuals. Looking to the record, the Court concluded that
grounds for the distinction did not exist.
The analysis in Humphrey focused on possible grounds for different commitment procedures for sex offenders. Rather than hypothesize a basis for the differing treatment, the Court remanded the case
for an evidentiary hearing to determine, among other things, if there
was any special characteristic of sex offenders that would make a jury
trial inappropriate. Of course, the requirement of a concrete demonstration fits Professor Gunther's proposed test, but Gunther suggested
a showing of a factual tie between means and ends. Humphrey may
require some sort of showing for the more limited purpose of determining if adequate grounds for distinction benveen ostensibly similarly situated groups exist.
Reed, James, and Baird exhibit the same analysis in even more
striking fashion. In Reed, not only did the sex classification have to
facilitate probate procedure, but the intrinsic characteristic of the
class, sex, had to be shown to bear some relationship to expedited administration. The Court summarily concluded it did not. Possible
arguments of conceivable rationality that might have been presented
to explain the differing classification-for example, that men might
have more business experience-were not even discussed. Similarly,
in James the Court appeared to presume that indigent criminal defendants could not be distinguished from civil debtors for the purpose of denying certain exemptions from creditor process. The Court
did not consider the possible argument that indigent criminal defendants would be more likely to conceal assets than civil debtors. And
in Baird, although most of the opinion dealt with the consideration
154. See text accompanying notes 107-22 supra.
155. See text accompanying notes 83-93 supra.
156. See text accompanying note 114 supta.
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and rejection of purported legislative goals, in the closing portion of
the opinion the Court stated without discussion that married and unmarried persons were indistinguishable for the purpose of contraceptive distribution. Again, the similarity of situation was presumed.
Humphrey, James, Reed, and to a lesser extent, Baird, Weber, ·
Mosley,161 and]ackson, all suggest a heightened level of judicial review, with the focus on grounds of distinction between classes.158 The
level of scrutiny is uncertain, as most of the cases presumed the classes
to be indistinguishable, but the cases may be read as requiring at least
something more than conceivably rational grounds of distinction
where the posited grounds are not applicable in every case.159
The basis for the intensified review is not completely clear. Three
of the cases, Reed, Weber, and Baird, involved what might be termed
emerging fundamental rights or emerging suspect classifications.
Jackson and Humphrey could arguably fit this pattern, as both cases
concerned discriminatory commitment procedures of mentally disturbed or retarded individuals, a class that could trouble the Court
because it possesses many of the indicia of a suspect class.160 Mosley
and James involved fringe areas of already recognized rights-specifically, first amendment rights and the right of an indigent criminal to
assistance of counsel. In this regard Boraas seems a suitable case for
the application of a more stringent review, as it raises issues on the
fringe area of the recognized right of association.161
Applied to Boraas, this analysis would have the court focus on the
reasons for the different treatment accorded to ·related and nonrelated
157. Mosley did focus on the grounds for distinction between labor and all other
forms of picketing. However, the degree of review is easily explained by the presence
of first amendment rights in the case. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
158. It is not suggested that scrutiny of the grounds of distinction between groups
is an altogether new phenomenon. As Chief Justice Burger's quotation in Reed from
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1919), makes clear, such concern
has existed for many years: "[A classification] must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly situated shall be treated alike." 404 U.S. at 76. See also Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) Gack.son, J., concurring): "The framers of the
Constitution knew ••• that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary
and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens
the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose
only a few to whom they will apply legislation ••••" Noteworthy in the recent cases
is the virtual assumption, demonstrated by the summary refusal to consider justifying
arguments, that there are no grounds for distinction. This analytic technique is, by
and large, unique to the recent Supreme Court cases.
159. For instance, Reed could be interpreted as saying that, because not every woman
has less business experience than every man, this ground of distinction is not rational
enough to satisfy the equal protection clause.
160. See Comment, Segregation of Poor and Minority Children into Classes for the
Mentally Retarded by the Use of IQ Tests, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1212, 1236 (1973).
161. See authorities cited in note 20 supra.

536

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 72:!iOS

groups, rather than on the means-end connection.102 The inquiry
would center, not on possible traffic, noise, and congestion problems
caused by nonrelated groups, but on whether nonrelated groups cause
these assorted problems to a greater extent than do traditional families. Although the Boraas court was avowedly searching only for a
means-end connection, it does appear that, when applying its test,
it was actually focusing on the reasons for the distinction between
the classesJ63 At one point the court appears to ask for a factual showing justifying the differing treatment.164 The court also approached
the problem on a more generalized plane when, quoting Trottner, it
theorized that not every nonrelated group differs from traditional
families in the amount of noise, traffic, and congestion caused.10n The
fact that the classes were found to be identical in the relevant aspects,
apparently because the distinction was not valid for every, or at least
most, nonfamily groups, appears to indicate that the court, like the
cases it cites, was looking for more than a rational grounds of distinction. Although the lack of a distinction was not presumed in Boraas
as it was in Reed, James, or Baird, the court's analysis seems comparable to that of the Supreme Court in those cases. Nevertheless, even
accepting the interpretation of Boraas most consistent with the Supreme Court precedents, there is no explanation for why the Boraas
court felt constrained to drag the less onerous means analysis into its
opinion. It is thus unclear whether the lack of a demonstration of a
basis of distinction between the classes was a ground of decision, and
it is also uncertain what significance the court attached to the technique for which the precedents seem to stand.
In summary, while an expansive reading of the recent Supreme
Court cases indicates that some sort of middle-ground review may be
undertaken on occasion, the degree of additional scrutiny that may be
undertaken and the situations in which middle-ground review is applicable are unclear. Boraas exhibits some characteristics of this postulated middle-ground approach but also strikes out into completely
new territory.

III. THE Rodriguez OPINION
Boraas was decided on February 27, 1973. On March 21, 1973, the
Supreme Court handed down its decision in San Antonio lndepen162. If, as in Humphrey, see text accompanying note 70 supra, the court wished to
make a factual determination of the issues, different results could occur in different
communities, for certain municipalities might be able to show additional burdens on
facilities due to occupancy of nonrelated persons, while others might not.
163. The court may have engaged in some means-end scrutiny in the section of the
opinion following the citation of Kirsch Holding Co. v. Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281
A.2d 513 (1971). See 476 F.2d at 817. That case found a similar zoning ordinance invalid
under a due process theory that stressed the lack of a means-end connection. See note 47
supra and text accompanying notes 237-41 infra,
164. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra,
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dent School District v. Rodriguez.166 The Rodriguez majority emphatically opted for the traditional two-tier equal protection approach, ignored the possibility of a new emergent standard, and read
some of the cases relied on by the Boraas court in such a way as to
negate any precedential value they might have had as harbingers of a
new equal protection.
Rodriguez involved a class action filed on behalf of certain Texas
school children challenging the constitutionality of the state's statutory system of financing public education under the equal protection
clause. The system authorized an ad valorem tax by each school district on property within the district to supplement educational funds
received from the state. This resulted in substantial interdistrict dis-.
parities in per-pupil expenditures; the disparities were chiefly attributable to the fact that differing amounts were received through local
property taxation because of variations in the amount of taxable
property within each district. A three-judge district court had held
that the system discriminated on the basis of wealth and was thus unconstitutional; it found that wealth was a suspect classification and
that education was a fundamental interest. In the alternative, the
court ruled that the state had failed to meet even the minimal scrutiny test.167 The Supreme Court, in a five-four decision, reversed.
At the outset of the opinion, the Court described its framework
for analysis:
We must decide, first, whether the Texa;; system of financing public
education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected
by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny • . . .
If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined to determine whether
it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,168
The Court thus clearly opts for nvo-tier equal protection. The middle ground proposed in Boraas played no part in the Court's analytic
framework,1 69 and the remainder of the opinion confirms the express
adoption of a nvo-level analysis.
166. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
167, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (1971).
168, 411 U.S. at 17.
169. The Court did require a rational relation to a "legitimate, articulated state
purpose," a slight change over the traditional minimal scrutiny test, which deferred to
legislative enactments to the extent of hypothesizing justifying purposes. The change
to a requirement of an articulated rationale conforms to Professor Gunther's model
and also to the Boraas dissent's reading of recent Supreme Court opinions. However,
this slight change of judicial attitude would not affect the analysis of the Boraas majority, which had articulated state objectives on the record before it, The Supreme
Court cited no authority for the requirement of an articulated purpose, At later points
in the opinion, the Court stated the test in absolutely orthodox form. E.g., 411 U.S.
at 55. The Court's decision in Boraas also made no mention of a new standard. 42
U.S.L.W. at 4477.
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The Court first determined that no suspect classification was involved in the case. While not ruling directly on the issue of whether
classifications based on a lack of wealth are inherently invidious, the
Court noted that this was not a case where a classification involving
wealth entailed absolute denial of a benefit, pointed out that no clearcut class of the poor was being discriminated against, and rejected the
broad notion that a classific_ation that creates a class composed solely
of persons living in a district with less taxable wealth could be
deemed to be inherently suspect.17°
The Court then found that education was not a fundamental
right. To arrive at this conclusion, the Court posited a standard for
determining if a right is fundamental: "[T]he key to discovering
whether education is 'fundamental' is not to be found in comparisons
of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution."171 Cited as authority for this proposition, inter alia, were Mosley and Baird.112 In a footnote, the Court
described Mosley as "[striking] down a Chicago antipicketing ordinance that exempted labor picketing from its prohibitions. The ordinance was held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause after subjecting it to careful scrutiny and finding that the ordinance was not
narrowly drawn. The stricter standard of review was appropriately applied since the ordinance was one 'affecting First Amendment interests.' " 173 Justice Marshall, in dissent, also interpreted Mosley as a case
calling for strict judicial scrutiny due to the presence of questions involving the guaranteed right of freedom of speech.174 Mosley thus can
no longer be cited as authority for the standard articulated in Boraas.
The Rodriguez Court also hinted that Baird could be viewed as a
strict scrutiny case. The majority said in a footnote that
[i]n Eisenstadt [v. Baird] the .Court struck down a Massachusetts
statute that prohibited the distribution of contraceptive devices, finding that the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection standard." ... Nevertheless, in dictum, the Court recited the
correct form of equal protection analysis: "[I]f we were to conclude
that the Massachusetts statute impinges upon fundamental freedoms
under Griswold ... , the statutory classification would have to be
not merely rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary
to the achievement of a compelling state interest."176
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
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33-34.
34.
34 n.75, quoting 408 U.S. at IOI.
99.
34 n.73, quoting 405 U.S. at 447 n.7 (emphasis original),
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It is possible to interpret this cryptic footnote as implying that Baird
is a strict scrutiny case because a right implicitly recognized in the
Constitution, the right of marital privacy, was impinged upon. Justice Marshall, in dissent, interpreted the case in this way.176 In any
case, the fact that the Court described the Baird holding as "finding
that the law failed 'to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection
standard' " and did not mention the intense level of review and lack
of tolerance to stated legislative purposes that characterized that opinion's analytic technique fits the case into the traditional two-level approach. Again, any precedential value as support for the Boraas opinion is significantly weakened.
The Court, after finding that education was not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution,177 went on to analyze the
Texas legislative scheme under the traditional standard of review.
Again, there was not even a hint of an intermediate standard. And, in
applying the rational relationship standard, the Court not only did
not carefully scrutinize the relationship of the means to the state purpose, but showed a great degree of tolerance and noted that "[t]he
very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system suggests that 'there will be more than one
constitutionally permissible method of solving them.' ..." 178 Ultimately, the Court found the state's financing system to be rationally
related to the legitimate purpose of encouraging local participation
in and control of each district's schools.179
The relationship of means to ends was attacked by appellees in a
manner suggestive of the Boraas approach: "Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas' dedication to local control of education.
To the contrary, they attack the school-financing system precisely because •.. it does not provide the same level of local control and fiss;al
flexibility in all districts. Appellees suggest that local control could be
preserved and promoted under other financing systems that resulted
in more equality in educational expenditures."180 In other words,
they argued that no rational relationship existed because there were
other financing systems that could raise revenue and encourage local
176. 411 U.S. at 103-04. See also 42 U.S.L.W. at 4477.
177. The Court was faced with, and rejected, the argument that education should

be considered a fundamental riggt because it was necessary if a person's right to free
speech and right to vote were to be exercised in a meaningful manner. The Court
thought that the argument would be equally applicable in the areas of welfare and
housing and thus would be at odds with past decisions. 411 U.S. at 37. It also noted that
"we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to
the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice." 411 U.S.
at 36 (emphasis original). Justice Brennan, in dissent, accepted the argument that there
was a ne.xus between education and first amendment rights and therefore would have
classified education as a fundamental right. 411 U.S. at 63.
178. 411 U.S. at 42, quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972).
179. 411 U.S. at 55.
180. 411 U.S. at 50.
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control without creating the same disparity in per-pupil expenditures. This argument is very similar to the two arguments accepted by
the Boraas court: that nonrelated groups do not always have an adverse effect on, for example, rent values and land use intensity; and
that the same goals could be achieved by less restrictive means.
The Rodriguez Court's response to this less oner~us means argument casts the Boraas analysis into grave doubt: "While it is no doubt
true that reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides ,less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some
districts than for others, the existence of 'some inequality' in the manner in which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a sufficient
basis for striking down the entire system."181 Applying the same analysis to Boraas, the fact that not every nonconsanguineous group has a
deleterious effect on legitimate zoning objectives would not render
the system unconstitutional, for it would indicate only the "existence
of 'some inequality' in the manner in which the State'slrationale is
achieved."182 The Rodriguez Court continued: "Nor must the financing system fail because, as appellees suggest, other methods of satisfying the State's interest, which occasion 'less drastic' disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only where state action impinges on
the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liberties must it
be found to have chosen the least restrictive altemative."183 Although
the Boraas court explicitly rejected application of strict scrutiny at
the outset of the opinion, it adopted a test that, as Rodriguez makes
clear, is only applicable in fundamental rights cases.
On the other hand, the Rodriguez opinion does contain more discussion of rationality than do earlier minimal scrutiny opinions. The
entire Texas funding scheme is set out in detail at the outset of the
opjnion,184 and there is some discussion of the actual operation of the
system.185 In reaching its conclusion, 'however, the Court accepted
quite docilely the state's argument that the scheme furthered the goal
of encouraging local participation and control while ensuring a basic
education. The Court, after simply quoting the statutes involved,
agreed that the system rationally supported the state goal:
181. 411 U.S. at 50-51, citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Dandrldge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). A month later, in Mourning v, Family Publications
Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973), the Court sustained the imposition on all members
of a defined class of an allegedly "imprecise" rule promulgated pursuant to the Truth in
Lending Act because it served to discourage evasion by a substantial portion of that
class of disclosure mechanisms required by Congress for consumer protection. This case
bears on any overinclusion argument that could be made when attacking a Boraas-type
of zoning ordinance. See text accompanying notes 236-43 infra,
182. Rodriguez, however, did involve an extremely complex problem, so the Court
may have been more tolerant of inexact classifications than it would be upon revlcw
of the relatively simple ordinance involved in Boraas.
183. 411 U.S. at 51.
184. 411 U.S. at 6-14.
185. 411 U.S. at 13-14, 15 nn. 38 &: 46.
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While it is no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation for
school revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some districts than for others, ... [i]t is ... well to
remember that even those districts that have reduced ability to make
free decisions ·with respect to how much they spend on education
still retain under the present system a large measure of authority as
to how available funds will be allocated. 186

After noting that the existence of some inequality can never be the
basis for striking down an entire system, the Court, in traditional
fashion, presumed the system valid: "[I]t is rooted in decades of experience in Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product of
responsible studies by qualified people. In giving substance to the
presumption of validity to which the Texas system is entitled ... it is
important to remember that at every stage of its development it has
constituted a 'rough accommodation' of interests in an effort to arrive
at practical and workable solutions."187
·
Thus, the Court, by and large, deferred to the state's position, a
far cry from requiring the factual showing that the Boraas court found
necessary. The detailed description in Rodriguez of the Texas plan
could have been included in response to the four dissenters,188 who all
questioned the system's rationality. The majority was also faced with
an adverse decision below, a state court decision invalidating a similar financing plan,189 and an unusual amount of public and scholarly
controversy and interest.190 It is more likely that these factors induced
the Court's long description of the Texas scheme than that the Court
was, without comment, requiring some sort of showing of a heightened rationality before validating the financing plan.
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, reiterated the majority's
approach: "I join the opinion and judgment of the Court because I
am convinced that any other course would mark an extraordinary departure from principled adjudicatfon under the Equal Protection
Clause .... " 191 Noting that the clause is o~ended only by laws that
make "wholly arbitrary or capricious" classifications,192 he went on to
state that this doctrine exemplifies "one of the first principles of con186. 411 U.S. at 50-51.
187. 411 ·U.S. at 55.
188. See 411 U.S. at 50 n.107, 51-52 n.108.
189, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P .2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
190. See, e.g., J. CooNs, W. CLUNE&: S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EnuCATION (1970); Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis
of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REY. 504 (1972); Comment, Educational Financing, Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 MICH. L.
R.Ev. 1324 (1972); Moynihan, Can Courts and Money Do It?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1972,
§ E, at 1, col. 3 {late city ed.).
_191. 411 U.S. at 59.
192. 411 U.S. at 60, citing Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), which was the chief
precedent for James. See 407 U.S. at 140-41; text accompanying notes 97-101 supra.
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stitutional adjudication-the basic presumption of the constitutional
validity of a duly enacted state or federal law.''193 This presumption
only disappears when a classification is based on suspect criteria104 or
"impinges on a substantive right or liberty created or conferred by
the Constitution.''195 He concluded by agreeing with the Court that
the classifications before the Court did not rest "on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective."196
Justice Stewart's emphasis on a presumption of legislative validity
differs strongly from Professor Gunther's model, which emphasizes a
less deferential attitude to legislative enactments in order to verify
the reality of means-end connection. Justice Stewart's re-emphasis of
the majority's "wholly irrelevant" language also clashes markedly
·with both Gunther's model and the Boraas majority's averred requirement of "substantial means-ends relationship."197
After Rodriguez, virtually nothing remains of a doctrinal base
for the Boraas opinion. While an intermediate standard is not explicitly rejected,1 98 the Court restates orthodox two-tier equal protection formulations and makes no mention of any third test. The
Court's application of the rational relationship test is noteworthy in
its tolerance of classifications admittedly creating "some inequal193. 411 U.S. at 60.
194. 411 U.S. at 61, citing, inter alia, Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., discussed in
text accompanying notes 83-93 supra.
195. 411 U.S. at 61, citing, inter alia, Police Dept. v. Mosley, discussed in text ac•
companying notes 72-82 supra.
196. 411 U.S. at 62.
197. Justice Marshall wrote a long and compelling dissent, joined by Justice Douglas,
Justice Marshall excoriated the "rigidified approach to equal protection analysis"
adopted by the majority, 411 U.S. at 99, and advocated instead a sliding-scale approach:
"We must consider the substantiality of the state interests sought to be served, and we ·
must scrutinize the reasonableness of the means by which the State has sought to
advance its interests." 411 U.S. at 124. "'[C]oncentration [is] placed upon the character
of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class
discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the
asserted state interests in support of the classification.'" 411 U.S. at 99, quoting
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970). See also Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U.S. 78, 90 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519·21
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his Rodriguez. dissent, Justice Marshall read Baird,
Reed, James, and Weber as supporting the sliding-scale approach. See 411 U.S. at 103-10,
Justice White now appears to support the position advocated by Justice Marshall.
See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
The obvious drawback to a flexible, ad hoc balancing approach based on a judicial
determination of the relative importance of the various rights and interests involved
is the resemblance that this bears to the discredited, see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963), fundamental rights due process test. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,
459-63 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164,
179-80 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85
(1970) (Stewart, J.); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 76-82 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
198. Justice Stewart did refer to the sliding-scale approach advocated by Justice
Marshall as taking "uncharted directions" and as a "departure from principled ad•
1
judication under the Equal Protection Clause," 411 U.S. at 59.
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ity."199 0£ the Boraas precedents, Baird,200 Weber, 201 and Mosley 202
were read in Rodriguez as cases requiring strict scrutiny. ]ames203 had
been cited by the Court in a previous opinion as lead authority for
the application of the minimal scrutiny test,204 and Reed205 has been
interpreted as involving a suspect class.206
199. Justice Stewart characterized the Texas financing plan as "chaotic and unjust."
4ll U.S. at 59.
200. See text accompanying notes 123-44 supra.
201. See text accompanying notes 83-93 supra.
202. See text accompanying notes 72-82 supra.
203. See text accompanying notes 94-106 supra.
204. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973).
205. See text accompanying notes 107-22 supra.
206. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 4ll U.S. 677, 682 (1973). Reed might also be viewed
as an e.xample of an unconstitutionally irrebuttable presumption. In Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441 (1973), the Court struck down, as violative of the due process clause,
portions of a Connecticut statute that categorized students at state colleges as residents
and nonresidents of the state for the purpose of assessing tuition. The statutory defini.
tions created a "permanent and irrebuttable presumption" of nonresidency for a
student's entire sojourn at the university if the student's legal address at the time of
admission was outside of Connecticut. No change in status was permitted, even if the
student had actually become a state resident. The Court held that, "since Connecticut
purports to be concerned with residency in allocating the rates for tuition and fees at
its university system, it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual
the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of non•
residence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when
the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination." 412
U.S. at 452. The Court later emphasized that the essential due process violation lay in
providing no opportunity to challenge the presumption. 412 U.S. at 453. The Court's
discussion closely tracked equal protection analysis, as various state justifying rationales
were considered and rejected, the means-end connection being considered either unrelated, or purely arbitrary. See 412 U.S. at 448-52.
The "irrebuttable presumption" approach was again employed in the Court's recent
decision in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 42 U.S.L.W. 4186 (U.S., Jan. 21, 1974),
which found mandatory statutory maternity leave regulations violative of the due process
clause as unduly impinging upon the fundamental right to bear children. 42 U.S.L.W.
at 4191. Limitations upon a teacher's eligibility to return to work after giving birth were
similarly struck down. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4192. One of the objectives put forward by the
state was the necessity of keeping physically unfit teachers out of the classroom. While
admitting that some teachers might become physically disabled after the fifth-month
cut-off date (the date of enforced leave), the Court stated that the rules sw·ept "too
broadly" and that, in the absence of an "individualized determination by the teacher's
doctor-or the school board's-as to any particular teacher's ability to continue at her
job," the provisions "'contain an irrebuttable presumption of physical incompetency."
42 U.S.L.W. at 4190. The Court noted that the record indicated that "each preguancy
was an individual matter, and should be prescribed for as such." 42 U.S.L.W. at 4190
n.12. The Court then suggested less onerous means of effectuating the same goal, 42
U.S.L.W. at 4191 n.14, and concluded that the rules "cannot pass muster under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they employ irrebuttable
presumptions." 42 U.S.L.W. at 4191.
This analysis is very similar to that employed in Boraas, in spite of the difference in
the ultimate ground of decision. It should be noted that LaFleur also quoted ap•
provingly from Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (1973), a Second Circuit
opinion involving similar facts decided under the equal protection test applied in
Boraas. Boraas, however, does not involve a legislatively explicit presumption, as did
all the cases in which the Court has applied the irrebuttable presumption approach.
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There is a certain rigidity in the Court's reading of its prior cases.
Its assumption that equal protection cases fall neatly into two cate,
gories ignores substantive difficulties in previous cases. Reed, Baird,
and, to a lesser extent, James, Humphrey, 201 and Weber, were all
avowedly rational basis cases but contained analytic techniques foreign to the minimal scrutiny standard. To refer to these cases as
adopting strict judicial scrutiny, as the Frontiero plurality did with
regard to Reed,208 and the Court has done with Weber, 200 is a real
failure to come to grips with the possibility of an intermediate standard of equal protection review. Nevertheless, Rodriguez and Frontiero indicate a clear disposition on the part of the Court to adopt an
exclusively two-tiered approachzlo and to interpret past cases accordingly. The Court's opinion in Boraas confirms this tendency.
It could be argued that Rodriguez shares many common features
·with the seven Boraas precedents. It involves the fringe areas of strict
scrutiny (a possible fundamental right, education; and a sometimes
suspect group, the poor)211 and was, therefore, an appropriate case in
which to employ some type of heightened scrutiny.212 The Boraas
To say that the Belle Terre ordinance contains an unconstitutional conclusive presump•
tion that all nonconsanguineous groups cause more traffic, noise, and other assorted
problems than traditional families, when the presumption does not appear in the
ordinance, is to appreciably extend the irrebuttable presumption technique.
LaFleur is further distinguishable. While the Court does use the "irrebuttable pre•
sumption" language, the case is similar to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Both are
decided under the due process clause; both involve women and the right to have
children; and both explicitly recognize the right as tied to the fundamental right of
personal privacy. It seems that LaFleur fits into the large class of cases that deal with
important personal rights and that, as a result, use a strict scrutiny approach. In effect,
when applying the label "irrebuttable presumption," the Court is drawing conclusions
after closely scrutinizing the means-end relationship, looking for less onerous means, and
finding that no compelling interest was involved.
An unrestrained use by the Court of the "irrebuttable presumption" approach could
lead to its completely supplanting equal protection analysis, Virtually every legislative
classification presumes that certain individuals fall within or without a classification, so
that any individual who falls within a classification, but who does not in fact further
the classification's objective, could challenge the legislation on the ground that it
created an irrebuttable presumption. Such an argument is not usually possible on equal
protection grounds, because it is a basic tenet of equal protection adjudication that
"classifications need not be made with mathematical precision." Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970), citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co,, 220 U.S. 61, 78
(1911).
207. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
208. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
209. See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra.
210. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Rodrigue: is the most succinct explica•
tion of this approach. See 411 U.S. at 59-62.
211. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (education). The majority in
Rodriguez suggested that complete deprivation of a generally held right because of
impecuniousness could call for strict judicial scrutiny. 411 U.S. at 20·22,
212. There is precedent for applying the compelling interest t~t in situations where
both a near fundamental right and a near suspect class are involved in the same case,
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precedents seemed to be focusing review on the grounds of distinction
between similarly situated groups. If this approach had been applied
in Rodriguez, the Court would have isolated the disparities in perpupil expenditures based on property tax revenues and then required
some showing by the state to justify the differential treatment between
districts. The Court did note the unequal expenditures in the Edgewood district, compared with more affluent districts,213 and looked
only to the record to explain the differential treatment; it refused to
hypothesize a justification. It also could be argued that the Court
carefully examined the workings of the state system and only foµnd
a rational basis for the distinction to exist when the strong state interest in local control of education was shown to be furthered by this
mode of financing.
However, this analysis would overlook the deference paid to the
state's arguments and the Court's insistence on applying the traditional formula to the case. The Boraas precedents, in their summary
refusal to consider conceivable grounds of distinction between
groups, appeared to place a burden on the state to justify differential
treatment. Any burden in Rodriguez was clearly on the appellees.
The Court indulged a presumption of legislative validity, agreed
·without concrete demonstration with the state's argument that local
control was furthered by the financing plan,214 and never accepted
the appellees' basic premise that reduced expenditures led to a corresponding reduction in quality of education.215 The inescapable
conclusion is that the equal protection test announced in Boraas
simply does not exist, or no longer exists, and that future adjudication
·will be within the parameters of the two-tier approc1:ch.
Soon after the Boraas opinion appeared, a poll of all the Second
Circuit judges was taken as to whether the case should be reheard~ en
banc.216 The petition was denied by a four-four vote. Immediately
after this poll Rodriguez was handed dmvn. Judges Timbers and
Mansfield, writing after Rodriguez, took the opportunity to comment.
Judge Timbers ·wrote that
0

the Supreme Court's very recent decision in [Rodriguez] strongly
indicates that the traditional minimal scrutiny equal protection
Thus, in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), and in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956), the presence of the interest in criminal appeal and the classification based on
ability to pay may have induced the court to scrutinize strictly the classification involved.

213. 411 U.S. at 18-14, 46,
214. See 411 U.S. at 50-54.
215. "On even the most basic questions in this area the scholars and educational
experts are divided, Indeed, one of the major sources of controversy concerns the
extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures
and the quality of education-an assumed correlation underlying virtually every legal
conclusion drawn by the District Court in this case," 411 U.S. at 42-43. '
216. 476 F.2d at 824.
.
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standard should have been applied in the instant case. In Rodriguez,
the Court held that "the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the State's system be shown to bear some rational
relationship to legitimate state purposes," should be applied .... In
short, the Court refused to "intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures." State or local decisions
regarding limitations on the use of land traditionally have been
accorded this same great deference by federal courts for the same
reasons a state's handling of public expenditures are not to be disturbed .... In the light of Rodriguez, it seems to me that a fortiori
the decision in the instant case, which surely constitutes a substantial
interference ·with a municipality's zoning policies, was erroneous. 217
Judge Mansfield replied,
[In Rodriguez,] the Court, following a well beaten path used in
review of certain types of economic discrimination, applied "the
traditional standard of review" to state legislation of an essentially
economic nature, ·which was challenged because of its social consequences.[2181 Here we are not concerned with commercial legislation
but with a local ordinance directed squarely against the personal
right£219 l of individuals to associate and live together ... .1 2201
If anything, our decision here is in accord with the Supreme Court's
decision in Rodriguez. In describing the standard applied by it, the
Court there stated that ... "the traditional standard of review.•.
requires only that the State's system be shown to bear some rational
relationship to legitimate State purposes" . . . . These statements
not only are consistent with our review but would require us to nullify the Belle Terre ordinance for failure to further any legitimate
zoning objective.221
217. 476 F.2d at 826-27. Rodriguez is, however, an example of a particularly complex
problem, in which "considerations of judicial competence" could partly explain the
noninterventionist stance of the Court. See note 147 supra.
218. Even granting arguendo that the legislative scheme was essentially economic
in nature, nothing in Rodriguez indicates any intention to limit traditional review to
such cases.
219. Justice Stewart has raised doubts as to the constructiveness of pursuing the
property right-personal right distinction that Judge Mansfield suggests:
o
[T)he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Prop•
erty does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without
unlawful deprivation no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in
truth a "personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a
home, or a saving account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence e.xists between
the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have
meaning without the other. That rigbts in property are basic civil rights has long
been recognized.
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). See also Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
220. The Boraas majority specifically stated that it was not ruling on claims of
privacy. 476 F.2d at 814. Judge Mansfield's statement suggests that the majority actually
balanced the rights affected and the legislative purpose, despite its disavowal of such
an approach.
· . 221. 476 F.2d at 828-29. The Supreme Court found that the ordinance furthered a
series of legitimate objectives. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4477. See note 34 supra.
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Judge Mansfield's argument, however, seems ingenuous. The
Rodriguez Court's presumption of legislative validity was manifested
by a clearly deferential stance towards legislative enactments; and,
in determining whether the requisite rational relationship existed, the
Court stated that imperfect classifications are acceptable. Boraa.s,
while stating that the ordinance did not appear to be supported by
any rational basis, reached the conclusion by applying a different
equal protection test, by rejecting other possible zoning objectives,
and, apparently, by requiring that no less onerous means be available.
In spite of a bare holding utilizing words similar to the Rodriguez
standard, the rationales of the two cases are not consistent.

IV. Boraas UNDER TRADITIONAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Two arguments remain under which the Second Circuit might
be said to have found the ordinance to be unconstitutional under
traditional standards: The classification might be found to be either
underinclusive or overinclusive to the point of arbitrariness.
Boraas could be read as accepting the view that the classification
at issue was unconstitutionally underinclusive in that it excluded
some persons who would also contribute to the problems to which
the ordinance was directed. The court appeared to reject the argument that members of unrelated groups would be more likely to
cause traffic, parking, and congestion problems than members of a
traditional family. Quoting from Trottner,222 it noted that a case
dealing with a Boraas-type of ordinance, Palo Alto Tenants Union v.
Morgan,223 considered the same arguments and found a rational relationship between the classification and the zoning goals. That court
held that no irrationality was involved:
[G]iven the fact that the average size of even the traditional family
is less than four members, the [c]ourt sees no arbitrariness in limiting
the number of unrelated persons living in an R-1 dwelling, while
not so limiting the size of the traditional family in such dwellings ....
. • . Noise, traffic problems, and overloaded parking facilities may
tend to result when one-family homes become communal dwellings.
. . . Often owners find it more profitable to rent these dwellings,
not to single families, but to large groups of unrelated persons with
independent sources of income. Such groups are able to pay, collectively, far more in rent than can traditional families with one, or at
best two, wage earners. Thus the rent structure of a whole neighbor222. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra. It should be noted, however, that
the holding in Trattner was not that the ordinance violated the due process clause or
equal protection clauses, but that the zoning enactment was outside the scope of the
Illinois enabling statute. This maneuver is not available in Boraas, since New York
state courts have upheld identical ordinances. See City of Schenectady v. Alumni Assn.,
5 App. Div. 2d 14, 168 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1957); Town of North Hempstead v. Griffin, 71
Misc. 2d 864, 337 N.Y.S.2d 318 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
223. 321 F. Supp. 908 (1970) a[Jd., 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973).

.548

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 72:508

hood may be affected by opening R-1 zones to large, unrelated living
groups.:'124

The court also observed that the state had a clear interest in preserving the integrity of the biological and legal family,22 11 so that any
favoritism regarding traditional families was not an indication of
arbitrariness. 226
The underinclusion argument presents a difficult question. While
it is hard to say that in no case will unrelated groups cause more
problems than traditional families, 227 surely the Trottner opinion is
correct in saying that in many instances traditional families cause the
same problems. For instance, the ordinance would allow groups of
blood-related individuals, regardless of group size or degree of relation, to occupy the same structure. Nevertheless, after Rodriguez, the
Palo Alto decision, rather than Boraas, appears to be the analysis that
will be followed. Rodriguez states that "the existence of 'some inequality' in the manner in which the State's rationale is achieved is
not alone a sufficient basis for striking down the entire system,"228 and
both Boraas and Trottner admit that unrelated groups do cause more
noise, traffic, and congestion in some cases. It therefore cannot be
said the classification lacks any rational basis.
Nor does the decision in United States Department of Agriculture
v. Moreno,229 in which the Supreme Court found a statutory scheme
similar to the one in Boraas unconstitutional, necessarily alter this
reasoning. Moreno involved the Department of Agriculture's foodstamp program. Eligibility was determined on a "household" basis,
and Congress redefined "households" to exclude groups of unrelated
individuals.230 The Court found the definition unrelated to any statutory objective. The nvo stated purposes of the food-stamp program
were improvement of the agricultural economy through use of surplus
commodities and the alleviation of malnutrition. The Court did not
deal with the possible right of association involved and, in traditional
equal protection language, held that "[t]he challenged classification
... is clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act. ... '[T]he
relationships among persons constituting one economic unit and
224. 321 F. Supp. at 912-13.
225. 321 F. Supp. at 911.
226, The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the case should be decided
under the strict scrutiny standard because their fundamental right of association was
being adversely affected. 321 F. Supp. at 911-12. That issue was not reached in Boraas.
227. However, the argument that unrelated persons typically own more automobiles
than members of related groups and thus pose additional parking and traffic problems
might be legitimate.
228. 411 U.S. at 51.
229. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
230. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970): An exception was made for unrelated individuals over
60 years old.
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sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with their abilities to
stimulate the agricultural economy ... or with their personal nutritional requirements.• " 231
The Court then tried to justify the classification by relating it to
an imputed legislative purpose. The argument was made that the
classification was rationally related to the legitimate governmental
purpose of preventing fraud in the food-stamp program, because
households of unrelated persons might contain more individuals who
would fail to report income sources. The Court differed from the
Gunther model in that it was willing to discuss this hypothetical
objective, but it found the classification not rationally related to the
objective for two reasons: The Court said that the Food Stamp Act
already contained criminal provisions, so it was doubtful that fraud
prevention was, in truth, the objective of the new provision.232 The
Court then noted that the practical operation of the provision had no
effect on fraud because, by no longer purchasing food with the others
or by using separate cooking facilities, an individual could establish
himself as a separate "household" and still conceal income so as ·to
remain eligible for food-stamp benefits.233 While agreeing that a
classification need not be drawn with "precise mathematical nicety"
to be sustained, the Court concluded that the classification in question
was not only imprecise, but without any rational basis.234 The Court
did rely on the-information before it to reach this result and did not
simply accept any conceivable relationship, but, as in ]ackson,235 the
case indicates that where the information before it leads to a definite
conclusion a court will accept that conclusion, rather than a conceivable relationship shown to be inapplicable. No similar analysis
is available in Boraa.s.
Moreno differs from Boraa.s in that the objectives in the two cases
are entirely different. A finding that the denial of food stamps to
groups of unrelated persons is grossly underinclusive for dealing with
the alleviation of malnutrition does not control a decision as to
whether the same type of classification is grossly underinclusive when
applied to zoning goals. In spite of the virtual identity of the classification in the two cases, the legal issues are unconnected.
Boraa.s briefly mentioned classificatory overinclusion as a possible
reason for voiding the Belle Terre law but seemed to equate that
approach with less onerous means analysis.236 The Boraa.s majority
231. 413 U.S. at 534, quoting Moreno v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 345 F.
Supp. 310, 313 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court).
232. 413 U.S. at 536-37. The·reasoning is reminiscent of Baird. See 405 U.S. at 452.
233. 413 U.S. at 537.
234. 413 U.S. at 538.
235. See text accompanying notes 62-68 supra.
236. See 476 F.2d at 817.
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might have found that the classification swept in so many individuals
who were not causing traffic, noise, or parking problems that it was
arbitrary. For example, the ordinance might have prevented three
maiden ladies, three clergymen who only owned bicycles, or three
judges from living in the same home. The court may have had this
approach in mind, as the only case cited as support in the less onerous
means section of its opinion was the New Jersey case of Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan. 287
Kirsch involved a zoning ordinance, similar to that in Boraas, that
was promulgated by a summer-resort community in an attempt to
prevent "uninhibited social conduct of many such group rental occupants . . . [including] excessive noise at all hours, wild parties,
intoxication, acts of immorality, lewd and lascivious conduct and
traffic and parking congestion."238 Although the existence of these
problems was an established fact, and the ordinances would effectively
abolish this type of group rental, the court struck down the ordinance
as arbitrary and unreasonable. The due process clause was utilized as
the standard of review, and the court stated the test as follows:
[S]ubstantive due process demands that zoning regulation ... must
be reasonably exercised-the regulation must not be unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, the means selected must have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the
regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the
evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which
do not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the
problem sought to be ameliorated.2ao
The court found that too many innocuous groups were excluded from
the ordinance's definition of family, so the ordinance was not up•
held.240
The case might be distinguished from Boraas because of its resort
context and because of the fact that the Belle Terre law was not aimed
at prohibiting specific antisocial conduct, but was designed to further
more general police power goals. However, the New Jersey supreme
court discussed the Trottner opinion favorably and also criticized an
earlier New Jersey case 241 that had upheld a blood-related family or237. 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
238. 59 N.J. at 245, 281 A.2d at 515.
239. 59 N.J. at 251, 281 A.2d at 518.
240. To the same effect, see Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112
N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (1970); Larson v. Mayor & Council, 99 N.J. Super. 365, 240
A.2d 31 (1968).
241. City of Newark v. Johnson, 70 N.J. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (1961), in which
single-family-dwelling owners had bee1,1 convicted of violating an ordinance because
they had boarded unrelated children in their home. The children were wards of the
State Board of Child Welfare. The ordinance was upheld as rationally related to the
prevention of over-congestion. A statute would now require a different result, See N.J.
STAT. ANN. 40:55-33.2 (1967).
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dinance in a purely residential setting. Applied to Boraas, the overinclusion argument would almost amount to an issue of fact: whether
the overinclusion was of such a substantial degree that the Rodriguez
imprecation, that inexact classifications must be tolerated, is surmounted.2 2 The overinclusion argument provides a possible, but
somewhat tenuous, ground with which to justify the Boraas decision.243
Ironically, the standard of review offering the most promise of
overturning the Belle Terre ordinance, was not an up-to-the-minute
strict scrutiny equal protection offshoot but the tried and true minimal rationality formulation. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found
that the ordinance met the minimal rationality standard. 24 The
Court had the opportunity, which it ignored in both Boraas and
Rodriguez, to deal with the possible existence of a new equal protection test. This failure indicates the Court's resolve to adhere to
two-tiered equal protection. While the Court's failure to discuss the
test is to be decried, the Second Circuit's own Boraas opinion points
out the ad hoc and unprincipled nature of the nascent equal protection test that, in the end, appears to have been stillborn.

242. Art argument based on overinclusion can be encompassed within the equal
protection clause. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 13, at

at 1086-87. But see note 181 supra.

1

243. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), which found a statutory definition creating

an "irrebuttable presumption" arbitrary by and large because it included too many
nonconforming members within the classification with no opportunity to revise their
status, would support the overinclusion approach of Kirsch. As previously noted,
however, the exact parameters of the irrebuttable presumption language have yet to be
determined. See note 206 supra. In some respects, the Kirsch decision goes beyond
Vlandis, for Ylandis contained express findings of no relation between the statutory
definition and any legitimate state objective, while the New Jersey court conceded the
relation of means to ends but nevertheless deemed the ordinance overinclusive to the
point of arbitrariness.
244. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4477.

